Jakarta (DreamLandLibrary) - September 30 Movement or often abbreviated as G 30 S PKI, G-30S / PKI, Gestapu (September Thirty Movement), Gestok (One October Movement) is an event that takes place after the night of September 30 to the beginning of September October 1, 1965 in which six high-ranking Indonesian military officers and several others were killed in an attempted coup attempt which was later accused of members of the Indonesian Communist Party.
Background of the 45th PKI Anniversary Celebration in Jakarta in early 1965
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is the largest communist party in the entire world, outside of China and the Soviet Union. Until 1965 its members numbered around 3.5 million, plus 3 million from the youth movement. The PKI also controlled the trade union movement which had 3.5 million members and the Indonesian Farmers Farmers movement which had 9 million members. Including the women's movement (Gerwani), the writer's and artist's organization and the bachelor's movement, the PKI had more than 20 million members and supporters.
In July 1959 the parliament was dissolved and Sukarno adopted a constitution under a presidential decree - again with the full support of the PKI. He strengthened the hands of the armed forces by appointing military generals to important positions. Sukarno ran a "Guided Democracy" system. The PKI welcomed Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" warmly and assumed that he had a mandate for the alliance of Conception, namely between Nationalists, Religion and Communists called NASAKOM.
In the "Guided Democracy" era, collaboration between the PKI leadership and the national bourgeoisie in suppressing independent movements of the workers and peasants failed to solve pressing political and economic problems. Export revenues declined, foreign reserves declined, inflation continued to rise and bureaucrat and military corruption became epidemics.
Fifth generation
On the visit of Foreign Minister Subandrio to China, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai promised 100,000 weapons of type of chung, this offer was free without conditions and was then reported to Bung Karno but had not yet determined the time until the outbreak of the G30S.
In early 1965 Bung Karno, on the advice of the PKI as a result of the PRC's prime minister's offer, had the idea of a Fifth Force that was independent of ABRI. But Army officials disagreed and this raised suspicion between the military and the PKI.
From 1963 the PKI leadership increasingly tried to provoke clashes between mass activists and the police and military. PKI leaders also infiltrated the police and army with the slogan "common interests" of the police and "the people". PKI leader DN Aidit inspired the slogan "For Public Peace to Assist the Police". In August 1964, Aidit encouraged all PKI members to rid themselves of "sectarian attitudes" to the armed forces, calling on all left-wing writers and artists to make the "army mass" the subject of their works.
At the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965 thousands of peasants moved to seize land that was not their right to incitement to the PKI. Major clashes occurred between them and the police and landowners.
The clashes were triggered by PKI propaganda which stated that farmers were entitled to any land, no matter who owned the land (state property = common property). Most likely the PKI mimicked the Bolsevik revolution in Russia, where the people and the communist party seized the Tsar's property and distributed it to the people.
At the beginning of 1965, workers began to confiscate US rubber and oil companies. The PKI leadership responded by officially entering the government. At the same time, high-ranking military generals also became members of the cabinet. The generals entered the cabinet because his position in the military by Sukarno was likened to the rank of minister. This can be proven by the name of his position (Menpangab, Menpangad, and others).
PKI ministers not only sat next to the military leaders in Sukarno's cabinet, but they continued to foster a very dangerous illusion that the armed forces were part of a "people's" democratic revolution.
Appointment of a Body in Crocodile Hole
Aidit gave lectures to students of the armed forces school where he talked about "a feeling of togetherness and unity that is getting stronger every day between the army of the Republic of Indonesia and elements of Indonesian society, including the communists".
The Sukarno regime took steps against workers by banning strikes in industry. The PKI leadership did not object because according to them the industry belonged to the NASAKOM government.
Soon the PKI was clear about the preparations for the formation of a military regime, stating the need for the establishment of a "fifth force" within the armed forces, which consisted of workers and armed peasants. Instead of fighting for the mobilization of an independent mass to counter the growing military threat, the PKI leadership instead sought to limit this growing mass movement within the limits of the country's capitalist law. They, in front of military generals, tried to calm down that the PKI's proposal would strengthen the country. Aidit stated in a report to the PKI Central Committee that the "NASACOMIZATION" of the armed forces could be achieved and they would work together to create a "fifth force". The PKI leadership kept trying to suppress the revolutionary aspirations of the workers in Indonesia. In May 1965, the PKI Politburo still encouraged the illusion that the military and state apparatus were being changed to minimize the anti-people aspect of the state apparatus.
The issue of Bung Karno's illness Since 1964 until the eruption of the G30S, the issue of Bung Karno's illness had been circulating. This increased rumors and the issue of power struggles if Bung Karno died. But according to Subandrio, Aidit knew very well that Bung Karno was only mildly ill, so this was not a reason for the PKI to take such action.
Land and Revenue Sharing Issues In 1960 the Basic Agrarian Law (Basic Agrarian Law) and the Basic Production Sharing Act (Revenue Sharing Act) were actually a continuation of the Agrarian Committee which was formed in 1948. The Agrarian Committee that produced the UUPA consisted from government representatives and representatives of various peasant organizations that reflected the ten strengths of political parties at that time. Even though the law already exists, the implementation in the area did not work, causing friction between the smallholder farmers and the landowners who were afraid of being affected by the BAL, involving part of the mass of followers by involving the backing of the security forces. Prominent events in this context included the Bandar Betsi incident in North Sumatra and the event in Klaten which was referred to as 'unilateral action' and was then used as an excuse by the military to clean it up.
The commotion between the PKI and Islam (not only NU, but also with Persis and Muhammadiyah) basically occurred in almost all places in Indonesia, in West Java, East Java, and in other provinces as well, PKI in several places they even threatened the kyai that they would be slaughtered after 30 September 1965 (this proves that all elements of the PKI knew about the September 30 coup plan).
Malaysia Factor The newly formed Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 was one of the important factors in this incident [1]. The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was one of the causes of President Soekarno's closeness with the PKI, explaining the motivation of the soldiers who joined the G30S / Gestok movement (the One October Movement), and also ultimately led to the PKI abducting Army officials.
"Since the anti-Indonesian demonstration in Kuala Lumpur, where demonstrators stormed the Indonesian embassy building, tore up a photo of Sukarno, brought the symbol of the Garuda Pancasila state before Tunku Abdul Rahman - Prime Minister of Malaysia at the time - and forced him to step on Garuda, Sukarno's anger towards Malaysia also exploded. "
Sukarno who was furious because it condemned Tunku's actions who trampled on the symbol of the Indonesian state [2] and wanted to take revenge by launching a movement known as "Down with Malaysia" to the Malaysian Federation state which had deeply insulted Indonesia and the Indonesian president. Sukarno's order to the Army to "crush Malaysia" was responded to coldly by the generals at the time. On the one hand, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani did not want to fight Malaysia which was assisted by the British with the assumption that the Indonesian army at that time was inadequate for warfare of that scale, while on the other hand the Army Chief of Staff A.H. Nasution agreed with Sukarno's proposal because he was worried that the Malaysian issue would be ridden by the PKI to strengthen its position in the political arena in Indonesia.
The position of the Army at the time was awry because on the one hand they were not sure they could defeat the British, and on the other hand they would face Sukarno who went berserk if they did not fight. Eventually the Army leaders chose to fight halfheartedly in Kalimantan. Not surprisingly, Brigadier General Suparjo, commander of the troops in West Kalimantan, complained, the confrontation was not carried out wholeheartedly and he felt his operations were sabotaged from behind [3]. This can also be seen from the failure of guerrilla operations in Malaysia, even though the Indonesian army was actually very proficient in guerrilla warfare.
Knowing that the Indonesian military did not support him, Sukarno was disappointed and turned to seek PKI support to vent his anger on Malaysia. Soekarno, as written in his autobiography, admitted that he was a person who had very high self-esteem, and that nothing could be done to change his desire to "crush Malaysia".
"Sukarno was an individualist. Humans who stand up with a deep inner voice, people who admit that they love themselves, it is impossible to become a satellite that is attached to other nations. Soekarno could not possibly devote himself to any domination of power. He can't be a doll. "
On the part of the PKI, they became the biggest supporters of the "crush Malaysia" movement which they considered to be a British henchman, a nekolim henchman. The PKI also took advantage of the opportunity for their own benefit, so the PKI's motives for supporting Sukarno's policies were not entirely idealistic.
When the PKI got a breath of fresh air, it was precisely its opponents who faced a terrible situation; they saw the PKI's increasingly strong position as a threat, plus the international relations of the PKI with the world Communist Party, especially with the axis of Jakarta-Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang-Phnom Penh. Sukarno also knew this, but he decided to keep it quiet because he still wanted to borrow the power of the PKI for the ongoing confrontation, because of Indonesia's weakened position in the international environment since Indonesia's departure from the United Nations (January 20, 1965).
A secret document from the newly opened United States intelligence agency (CIA) dated January 13, 1965 mentioned a casual conversation between Sukarno and right-wing leaders that he still needed PKI support to deal with Malaysia and therefore he could not take firm action against them. But he also stressed that someday "the PKI's turn will arrive." Soekarno said, "You can be my friend or enemy. It's up to you. ... For me, Malaysia is the number one enemy. One day I will clean up the PKI, but not now. "[2]
From the Army side, the internal divisions that began began to emerge when many soldiers, mostly from the Diponegoro Division who were upset and disappointed at the attitude of the army officials who feared Malaysia, fought only halfheartedly, and betrayed the mission given by Sukarno. They decided to contact the people of the PKI to cleanse the army of these generals.
Factors of the United States United States at that time was involved in the Vietnam War and tried hard to prevent Indonesia from falling into communism. The role of the United States intelligence agency (CIA) in this incident was limited to giving 50 million rupiah (money at that time) to Adam Malik and walkie-talkies and medicines to the Indonesian army. American politicians in these decisive months were faced with a confusing problem because they felt drawn by Sukarno to this Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation.
One view says that the role of the United States in this matter is not large, this can be seen from the telegram of the Ambassador of Green to Washington on August 8, 1965 who complained that his efforts to counter anti-American propaganda in Indonesia did not produce results or were not even useful at all . In a telegram to President Johnson on 6 October, CIA agents expressed distrust in the PKI's actions that were unreasonable because of Indonesia's political situation which greatly benefited them, and until the end of October there was still confusion over the massacres in Central Java, East Java, and Bali carried out by PKI or NU / PNI.
Other views, especially from the victims of this incident, stated that America became an actor behind the scenes and after the decree Supersemar America gave a list of names of PKI members to the military to be killed. But until now these two views do not have much physical evidence.
Economic factors The economy of the Indonesian people at that time was very low resulting in popular support for Sukarno (and the PKI) fading. They did not fully agree with the policy of "crush Malaysia" which is considered to further aggravate the situation of Indonesia.
Inflation that reached 650% made food prices soar, people starved and were forced to queue for rice, oil, sugar, and other basic necessities. Some factors that contributed to this price increase were Suharto-Nasution's decision to raise the salaries of the soldiers by 500% and the persecution of the Chinese traders which caused them to flee. As a result of inflation, many Indonesians only eat banana weevil, tubers, cassava, and other unfit food items; even they use cloth from sacks as their clothing.
This economic factor was one of the reasons for popular anger over the killing of the six generals, which resulted in a backlash against the PKI and the massacre of people accused of being PKI members in Central Java, East Java, Bali and other places.
On the morning of October 1, 1965, six senior generals and several others were killed in a coup attempt blamed on palace guards (Cakrabirawa) who were considered loyal to the PKI and at that time led by Lieutenant Colonel. Profit. The Commander of the Army's Strategic Command at the time, Maj. Gen. Suharto then carried out the crackdown on the movement.
The issue of the Council of Generals At a crucial moment around September 1965 the issue of the existence of a Council of Generals revealed that there were several Army officials who were dissatisfied with Sukarno and intended to overthrow him. Responding to this issue, Sukarno was said to have ordered Cakrabirawa's troops to arrest and bring them to trial by Sukarno. But unexpectedly, in the operations of arresting the generals, the actions of several persons who were consumed by emotions and killed Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani, Panjaitan, and Harjono.
The Issue of the Gilchrist Document The Gilchrist document taken from the name of the British ambassador to Indonesia Andrew Gilchrist circulated almost simultaneously with the issue of the Council of Generals. This document, which some have referred to as counterfeiting by Czech intelligence under the supervision of General Agayant of the Russian KGB, mentions the existence of a "Friend of Our Local Army" which suggests that Army officers had been purchased by the West. [4] The US embassy was also accused of giving a list of names of PKI members to the army to "follow up". The United States intelligence service obtained these data from various sources, one of which was written by John Hughes, a reporter for The Nation who wrote the book "Indonesian Upheaval", which was used as the basis for the film scenario "The Year of Living Dangerously", he often exchanged data- what data he collected to get telex facilities to send news.
The issue of Soeharto's involvement until now there is no evidence of Suharto's involvement / active role in the kidnapping action. The only evidence that could be elaborated was the meeting of Soeharto who was then serving as the Commander of the Army Commander (at that time the position of Commander of the Army Reserve Strategic Command was not in charge of the troops, unlike now) with Colonel Abdul Latif at the Army Hospital.
Nevertheless, Suharto was the party that benefited the most from this event. Many scientific studies that have been published in international journals reveal the involvement of Suharto and the CIA. Some of them are, Cornell Paper, by Benedict R.O'G. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey (Cornell University), Ralph McGehee (The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA), Government Printing Office of the US (Department of State, INR / IL Historical Files, Indonesia, 1963-1965. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel; Special Handling), John Roosa (Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia), Prof. Dr. W.F. Wertheim (Forgotten History of Th65 History).
Victim
The six high-ranking officials killed were:
- Lt. Gen. Ahmad Yani (Minister / Army Commander / Chief of Staff of the Highest Operations Command)
- Maj. Gen. Raden Suprapto (Deputy II Minister / Commander of the Army for Administration)
- Maj. Gen. Mas Tirtodarmo Haryono (Deputy III Minister / Commander of the Army for Planning and Coaching)
- Maj. Gen. Siswondo Parman (Assistant I Minister / Commander of the Army for Intelligence)
- Brigadier General Donald Isaac Panjaitan (Assistant IV Minister / Commander of the Army for Logistics)
- Brigadier General Sutoyo Siswomiharjo (Inspector of Justice / Oditur General of the Army)
TNI General Abdul Harris Nasution, who was the main target, survived the assassination attempt. Instead, his daughter Ade Irma Suryani Nasution and his aide, First Lieutenant CZI Pierre Andreas Tendean were killed in the assassination attempt.
In addition, several other people also became victims:
- Bripka Karel Satsuit Tubun (Official bodyguard of Deputy Prime Minister II, Dr. J. Leimena)
- Colonel Katamso Darmokusumo (Korem 072 Commander / Pamungkas, Yogyakarta)
- Lt. Col. Sugiyono Mangunwiyoto (Korem 072 / Pamungkas Chief of Staff, Yogyakarta)
The victims were then banished to a location in Pondok Gede, Jakarta known as Lubang Buaya. Their bodies were found on October 3.
In the aftermath of the funeral of the heroes of the revolution. Mayjen Suharto appears on the right
Anti-PKI propaganda literature after the G30S incident circulated widely in the community and accused the PKI of being the mastermind behind the "coup attempt".
After the assassination of several army officers, the PKI was able to control two vital communication facilities, namely the RRI studio on Jalan Merdeka Barat and the Telecommunications Office located on Jalan Merdeka Selatan. Through RRI, the PKI broadcast an announcement about the September 30 Movement aimed at high ranking officers of the "Council of Generals" who would hold a coup against the government. It was also announced the formation of a "Revolutionary Council", chaired by Lt. Col. Untung Sutopo.
In Central Java and DI. Yogyakarta, the PKI carried out the killings of Colonel Katamso (Korem 072 / Yogyakarta Commander) and Lieutenant Colonel Sugiyono (Korem 072 / Yogyakarta Chief of Staff). They were kidnapped by the PKI on the afternoon of October 1, 1965. These two officers were killed because they flatly refused to deal with the Revolutionary Council. On October 1, 1965 Sukarno and PKI secretary general Aidit responded to the formation of a Revolutionary Council by the "rebels" by moving to the Halim Air Force Base in Jakarta to seek protection.
On 6 October Sukarno appealed to the people to create "national unity", namely unity between the armed forces and their victims, and the cessation of violence. The Political Bureau of the PKI Central Committee immediately advised all members and mass organizations to support the "leaders of the Indonesian revolution" and not to fight the armed forces. This statement was reprinted in the CPA newspaper called "Tribune".
On October 12, 1965, USSR leaders Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin sent a special message to Sukarno: "We and our colleagues are delighted to hear that your health has improved ... We listen with interest about your speech at radio to all Indonesian people to stay calm and avoid chaos ... This appeal will be understood in depth. "
On October 16, 1965, Sukarno installed Maj. Gen. Suharto as Minister / Commander of the Army at the State Palace. Following is the quote of President Sukarno's message to Suharto when Suharto was sworn in [5]:
"I command General Major Soeharto, now the Army he leads I give to you, make this Army one Force from the Republic of Indonesia, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia which totally runs the Five Talismans of the Revolution, which altogether stand on Trisakti, which is the same once stood on Nasakom, which totally stood on the principle of Berdikari, which stood entirely on the principle of Manipol-USDEK.
The USDEK Manipol has been determined by our highest institution as the direction of the Republic of Indonesia. And because this Manipol-USDEK is the direction of the Republic of Indonesia, it must be upheld, carried out, fostered by all of us. By the Army, Navy, Air Force, State Police Force. Only if we stand completely on these Five Talismans, all of us, will our revousi be victorious.
Suharto, as commander of the Army, and as Minister in my cabinet, I command you, do what I command you as well as possible. I pray that God is always with us and with you!
"At a Conference of the Three Continents in Havana in February 1966, representatives of the Soviet Union tried their utmost to avoid condemning the arrest and killing of people accused of being PKI, which were taking place against the Indonesian people. Their stand was praised by the Suharto regime. The Indonesian Parliament passed a resolution on 11 February, declaring "full appreciation" for the efforts of representatives from Nepal, Mongolia, the Soviet Union and other countries at the Solidarity Conference of African States, Asia and Latin America, which succeeded in neutralizing the efforts of the counter-revolutionaries of the so-called September 30th movement, and their leaders and protectors, to interfere in Indonesia's domestic affairs. "
Arrests and massacres In the months after this event, all PKI members and supporters, or those considered to be PKI members and sympathizers, all known working class parties and hundreds of thousands of other Indonesian workers and peasants were killed or put in detention camps for tortured and interrogated. These killings occurred in Central Java (October), East Java (November) and Bali (December). The exact number of people slaughtered is unknown - conservative estimates say 500,000, while other estimates say two to three million people. But it is suspected that at least one million people were victims in the six-month disaster that followed the coup.
Instigated and assisted by the army, youth groups from right-wing Muslim organizations such as the Ansor NU and the Tameng Marhaenis PNI carried out mass killings, especially in Central and East Java. There are reports that the Brantas River near Surabaya became full of corpses until certain places of the river were "unstoppable".
By the end of 1965, between 500,000 and one million PKI members and supporters had been victims of killings and hundreds of thousands were imprisoned in concentration camps, with no resistance at all. When military teams supported by CIA funds [1] rounded up all known PKI members and supporters and carried out a heinous slaughter of them, "Time" magazine reported:
"The killings were carried out on such a scale that disposal of the corpse caused serious sanitation problems in North Sumatra, where the humid air carried the smell of corpses. People from these areas told us about true rivers. completely blocked by corpses. River transportation has become seriously hampered. "
On the island of Bali, which had previously been considered a PKI stronghold, at least 35,000 people were victims at the beginning of 1966. There the Tamin, the elite commandos of the Indonesian National Party, were the perpetrators of these killings. Special correspondent from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung tells about corpses on the roadside or dumped into excavations and about half-burnt villages where farmers do not dare to leave the frameworks of their homes that have been scorched.
In other areas, the defendants were forced to kill their friends to prove their loyalty. In big cities "anti-Chinese" racist hunts took place. Workers and government employees who went on strike in protest at these counter-revolutionary events were fired.
At least 250,000 workers and peasants were imprisoned in concentration camps. It is estimated that around 110,000 people are still imprisoned as political prisoners at the end of 1969. Executions are still carried out today, including dozens of people since the 1980s. Four political prisoners, Johannes Surono Hadiwiyino, Safar Suryanto, Simon Petrus Sulaeman and Nobertus Rohayan, have been sentenced to death for nearly 25 years since the coup.
Supersemar Five months after that, on March 11, 1966, Sukarno gave Suharto unlimited power through the March Eleven Order. He ordered Suharto to take "appropriate steps" to restore calm and to protect his personal security and authority. This unlimited power was first used by Suharto to ban the PKI. In recognition of his services, Sukarno was retained as titular president of the military dictatorship until March 1967.
The PKI leadership continued to urge the masses to obey the authority of the Sukarno-Suharto regime. Aidit, who had fled, was captured and killed by the TNI on 24 November, but his work was continued by PKI Second Secretary Nyoto.
Geneva Meeting, Switzerland Following the transfer of power to Suharto, a meeting was held between new order economists and CEOs of multinational corporations in Switzerland, in November 1967. Multinational corporations included oil companies and banks, General Motors, Imperial Chemical Industries, British Chemical Leyland, British American Tobacco, American Express, Siemens, Goodyear, The International Paper Corporation, US Steel, ICI, Leman Brothers, Asian Development Bank, and Manhattan Chase. The Indonesian Economic Team offers: abundant and cheap labor, abundant reserves and natural resources, and a large market.
This was documented by Jhon Pilger in the film The New Rulers of World (available on the google video site) which illustrates how Indonesia's natural wealth was divided like a spoils of war by foreign companies after the fall of Soekarno. Freeport gets gold in West Papua, Caltex gets oil fields in Riau, Mobil Oil gets gas fields in Natuna, other companies get tropical forests. Pro liberal economic policies have since been implemented.
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| Commemoration of the Pancasila Sakti Monument, Crocodile Hole |
After this incident, 30 September was celebrated as the Anniversary of the 30 September Movement. The following day, October 1, was designated as the Pancasila Power Day. During the Soeharto era, usually a film about the incident was also shown on all television stations in Indonesia every year on 30 September. In addition, during the Soeharto era, a flag ceremony was usually held at the Pancasila Sakti Monument in Lubang Buaya and continued with a flower sow at the tomb of the heroes of the revolution at TMP Kalibata. But since the Reformation era rolled out, the film has not been aired anymore and only the tradition of sowing flowers continued.
On September 29 - October 4, 2006, a series of commemorative events was held to commemorate the killing of hundreds of thousands to millions of people in various parts of Indonesia. The event entitled "Cultural Arts Week in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the 1965 humanitarian tragedy" took place at the Faculty of Cultural Sciences, University of Indonesia, Depok. Besides the University of Indonesia academic community, the event was also attended by victims of the 1965 humanitarian tragedy, including Setiadi, Murad Aidit, Haryo Sasongko, and Putmainah.
References and further reading (English) Easter, David, '"Keep the Indonesian pot boiling": Western intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966', Cold War History, Volume 5, Number 1, February 2005.
^ Artikel Kompas bertajuk "Sukarno, Malaysia, dan PKI" tanggal Sabtu, 29 September 2007
^ a b Soekarno, PKI & Malaysia di DetikForum
^ (JAC Mackie, 1971, hal 214)
^ Alex Dinuth "Dokumen Terpilih Sekitar G30S/PKI" Intermasa, Jakarta 1997 ISBN 979-8960-34-3
^ Setiyono, Budi; "REVOLUSI BELUM SELESAI: Kumpulan Pidato Presiden Soekarno 30 September 1965"; Nawaksara, Jakarta; 2003
Pranala luar (Indonesia) Soebandrio: Kesaksianku Tentang G30S (BAB I)
(Indonesia) Tulisan tentang keterlibatan CIA dalam G 30S/PKI disertai cuplikan isi laporan CIA untuk Presiden Lyndon Johnson
(Inggris) Kolektif Info Coup d'etat 65
(Indonesia) People's Empowerment Consortium
(Indonesia) Pelajaran-Pelajaran Dari Kudeta 1965 Indonesia
(Indonesia) Indonesian Institute for the study of the 1965/1966 Massacre
(Indonesia) Menyingkap Kabut Halim
(Indonesia) Dalih Pembunuhan Massal, karya John Roosa yang dilarang Jaksa Agung
Source : http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerakan_30_September
Photo: Special
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